


















and Frances StewartUnited Nations Development Programme  
Human Development Reports  





































Gustav Ranis is Frank Altschul Professor Emeritus of International Economics, Yale University. Email:  
Gustav.Ranis@yale.edu 
 
Frances Stewart is Director of the Centre for Research on Inequality, Human Security and Ethnicity, University of 
Oxford.  Email: Frances.stewart@qeh.ox.ac.uk 
 
Comments should be addressed by email to the author(s). Abstract 
 
The paper reviews experience in advancing Human Development since 1970 by investigating 
behaviour among countries that made the largest improvements in HD, and those that made the 
least improvement. The three developing countries with the fastest growth in the HDI over the 
period are selected from initial low-HDI, middle HDI- and high HDI country groupings, and 
their experience compared on a range of indicators.  
Certain characteristics were common to all success cases: good or moderate educational 
enrolment ratios; good or moderate female/male enrolment ratios; and good or moderate Human 
Poverty Indices. The other three major inputs into success appear to be growth, social 
expenditure and income distribution, and the successful countries showed different combinations 
of performance on these. Weak performers all experienced poor or moderate economic growth.  
Two classes of weak performance were: low income countries with weak growth, poor 
distribution and high poverty; and transition countries where economic, institutional and 
demographic disruptions led to poor progress. 
We also look beyond the HDI as an indicator of HD, explore such other features as political 
freedoms, security and environmental sustainability, and find little correlation between 
achievements on these indicators (both in levels and changes) with success and failure with 
respect to the HDI. Finally we provide short country vignettes of some of the success and failure 
cases, exploring some historical and institutional features associated with their performance. 
 
Keywords: Human Development, growth, income distribution. 
 







The H uman D evelopment R esearch P aper ( HDRP) S eries i s a m edium f or  sharing r ecent 
research commissioned to inform the global Human Development Report, which is published 
annually, and further research in the field of human development. The HDRP Series is a quick-
disseminating, informal publication whose titles could subsequently be revised for publication as 
articles in professional journals or chapters in books. The authors include leading academics and 
practitioners from around the world, as well as UNDP researchers. The findings, interpretations 
and conclusions are strictly those of the authors and do not  necessarily represent the views of 
UNDP or United Nations Member States. Moreover, the data may not be consistent with that 




The aim of this paper is to review experience in advancing HD since 1970; to identify 
countries that made the largest improvements in HD, as well as those that have made the least 
improvement. We aim to explore whether and which particular characteristics of the 
economy and of policy are associated with these outcomes. We will define success and 
failure for this purpose according to the HDI. 
 
We also look beyond the HDI as an indicator of HD, and explore other features, such as 
political freedoms, inequality, environmental sustainability, to see how far achievements on 
these indicators (both in levels and changes) are associated with success and failure with 
respect to the HDI. 
 
Finally we provide short country vignettes of some of the success and failure cases. 
 
2. Defining success and failure.  
 
A major issue, of course, is how to identify success and failure. We confine attention to 
countries with populations of 1 million or more in 1970.
1
                                                           
* Thanks to George Gray Molina and Mark Purser for help on data, and to Daniel Vujcich and Cheryl Zhao for 
research assistance; to Rachael Diprose for assistance on the Indonesian case;  to Sara Lowes  for assistance on 
the Kazakhstan case; and the HDRO office for very helpful comments on a previous draft. 
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As far as changes are concerned, there are some difficult issues of method.  Two possible 
approaches are to take the countries that have had the fastest growth in HDI; or the countries 
that have had the largest short-fall reduction. The short fall reduction method, of course, 
initially provided the basis for the calculation of the HDI, and for changes in HDI. However, 
it gives a major advantage to countries that start with high levels. For example, a country 
which improves its life expectancy by ten years, from a low starting point, may well achieve 
less in terms of shortfall reduction than a country whose life expectancy increases by one 
year, starting at a high level. On the other hand, an approach which selects countries 
according to the percentage rate of increase of HDI gives a major advantage to countries that 
start with low levels since the same absolute improvement represents a much higher 
percentage improvement for countries with low initial starting points.  The two methods yield 
very different lists of countries that have ‘succeeded’ and ‘failed’, and neither method is fully 
satisfactory. In fact, there are no countries that appear both among the top 10 HD performers 
defined in terms of growth in the HDI and those that appear as having had the greatest 
shortfall reduction (Molina and Purser 2010).  
 
 There is thus a real dilemma as to how to evaluate changes in performance among countries 
with very different starting points. To deal with this, whether in terms of growth or shortfall 
reduction, different starting points should be taken into account.  Consequently, we decided 
to group countries according to their initial conditions, i.e. by historical level of HD as 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
1 We discard the experience of very small countries as their wider relevance is limited, following conventional 
practice.    3 
measured by the HDI, -- high HD; medium HD; and low HD in 1990, as this was the first 
year of the HDR.  
 
The method adopted of comparing only countries within HDI categories avoids the problem 
that growth rates exaggerate the achievements of low level starters and shortfall reductions 
exaggerate the achievements of high level starters, and thus helps to allow for differences in 
initial conditions. Using both growth and shortfall reduction methods in this way, we identify 
the three best and the three worst performers in HDI change for each category, for 1970-
2007,  as shown in Table 1. It turns out that once we take into account the initial conditions as 
outlined above, it is important to note that the two approaches give identical results in terms 
of country identification.  
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Table 1: Shortfall reduction: Global best and worst performance for 1970-2007 HDI shortfall reduction countries (excluding developed 
countries and Eastern Europe ) 
   Country    Population, m     
Best by HDI 1990 category  
  




HDI growth, annual % growth 1970-
2007 
High HDI 
   Mexico  85.9  107.5  Mexico  0.60 
   Chile  76.1  16.6  Chile  0.53 
   Panama   69.3  3.3  Panama  0.48 
Medium HD     
   Laos  100  6.1  Laos  1.22 
   Indonesia  99.7  224.7  Indonesia  1.22 
   Tunisia  96.5  10.1  Tunisia  1.18 
Low HDI     
  Nepal  100  28.3  Nepal  1.73 
   Bangladesh  72.2  157.8  Bangladesh  1.25 
   Benin  67.2  8.4  Benin  1.16   5 
 
 
              
Worst by HDI 1990 category     
High HDI 
   Ukraine  5.3  46.3  Ukraine  0.04 
   Trin and Tob  24.7  1.3  Trin and Tob   0.17 
  Kazakhstan  44.5  15.4  Kazakhstan  0.31 
Medium HDI  
   Zambia   -0.1  12.3  Zambia  0   
   Uzbekistan  14.1  26.9  Uzbekistan  0.12 
     Moldova  16.9  3.7  Moldova  0.21 
Low HDI 
   Congo dem   24.7  62.5  Congo dem  0.40 
   CAR   41.3  4.3  CAR  0.72 
  Uganda  43  30.6  Uganda  0.74   6 
   
Figure 1 
Source: data provided by HDRO 
 
Figure 1 shows the average levels for 1970-2005, for the best and worst performing countries 
in terms of change over time. Here and in all figures below blue (or pale when printed in 
black and white) indicates the best performers; and red (or dark) indicates the worst 
performers. We can see from this that there is no marked difference between best and worst 
performing countries in levels  of HDI over the period. There is, of course, a marked 
difference in changes over time between the best and worst performers as shown in Figure 2 
and Table 1.  Figure 2 illustrates clearly how use of the percentage change in HDI as a 
criterion of performance favours low HDI countries, relative to higher ones. 




Source: data provided by HDRO 
 
3. Identifying proximate causes of success and failure on HDI, 1970-2005  
 
First we identify a range of indicators that previous work suggests is associated with success 
or failure (Ranis, Stewart and Ramirez 2000; Ranis and Stewart 2000; Boozer et al. 2004; 
Molina and Purser 2009; McGuire 2010). These indicators have been identified as related to 
success or failure by both econometric cross-country investigations and  case studies.  Among 
the variables these studies found to be associated with success/failure on HDI are: 
1.  The social expenditure ratio (i.e. health plus education expenditure as a proportion of 
GDP).   8 
2.  The level of education of the population, identified by primary and secondary 
education enrolment rates. 
3.  The ratio of female to male primary enrolment rates. 
4.  The level and growth in per capita incomes. 
5.  Income distribution 
6.  Poverty rates 
We recognise that two of these indicators – income per capita and educational enrolment 
rates - are components of the HDI, but previous research suggests that they are also inputs 
into other components and are therefore included (Behrman 1990, 1996; Ranis, Stewart and 
Ramirez 2000). 
 
In principle, both levels of variables and changes in these variables might be relevant to 
explaining success and failure in change in HDI over time. The levels are potentially relevant 
because the size, for example, of social expenditure ratios, is likely to affect the expansion of 
services over time. Income distribution levels, as well as the change in income distribution, 
will affect how different groups behave towards education.  And the enrolment rate in 
education is likely to affect the take-up of new health interventions. Below we show levels at 
the beginning and end of the period for each country where data permit, so as to indicate both 
levels and changes.  For each country, the first bar shows the initial value of the variable and 
the second, adjacent, bar, the value at the end of the period. 
 
   9 
Our aim is to determine whether there are systematic patterns or combinations of patterns 
leading to success or failure. There are five possibilities: 
1.  That the variables in question are associated with achievement in the sense that their 
values are correlated with success or failure. 
2.  That high or low values of the variables in question are necessary conditions for 
success or failure. 
3.  That high or low values of the variables in question are sufficient conditions for 
success or failure. 
4.  That high or low values of the variables are both necessary and sufficient for success 
or failure; and 
5.  That  alternative combinations of the values of these variables lead to success or 
failure.  
 
The aim of the analysis below is to identify which variables, or combination of variables, 
leads to success or failure in relation to these possibilities.  
 
For each of the indicators listed we assembled data for the average of the period 1970-2007 
(or latest available date), though in many cases data were only available for the more recent 
years, and for some countries no data were available at all. 
 
   10 
In general, there were few systematic findings, comparing the good and bad performers, in 
terms of levels of variables and  more in terms of changes, as shown in Figures 3- 11 and 




Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators (WDI) 
 






Source: UNESCO Institute for Statistics 






(first date for Kazakhstan ,Uzbekistan, Ukraine and Moldova is 1980) 
Source: WDI 

































Gini coefficient, 1980 and 2005 (or nearest date), for 
best and worst HDI performers
high HDI medium HDI low HDI  14 
 
Figure 10  















































































































































% of population below $1 a day poverty line, 1990 and 
2006, or nearest date, for best and worst HDI 
performers
high HDI medium HDI low HDI
Figure 11  


























































































































































Human Poverty Index, 1995 and 2007, for best 
and worst performers
low HDI medium HDI low HDI  15 
Data are notably lacking for social expenditure –  In Figure 3 we therefore show only 
education and even here we don’t have data for both 1970 and 2007 for a number of 
countries. (Figure 4 shows education plus health as a % of GDP for 2007, for purposes of 
comparison).  
 
In terms of levels of indicators there is little difference between the good and bad performers. 
In fact, some of the other variables we had expected to be associated with success or failure 
were shared across the two categories: for example, social expenditure ratios were, in fact, 
somewhat higher among the weak performers (see Figure 3 and 4 and Tables 2 and 3); the 
combined enrolment ratios were also similar across good and bad cases, as was the 
female/male enrolment ratio. Two general points are relevant here: first, that many of the 
weak countries are from the former socialist block (Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Moldova)  which 
had high social expenditure and good education ratios (including good female/male ratios), 
but the transition shock caused them to suffer severe setbacks on growth and HD. Secondly, 
social expenditure as such does not say anything about the allocation within the social 
sectors, such as between hospitals and public health, or what we have termed earlier, the 
priority ratio (Ranis and Stewart 2000). The vignette cases presented later, will illuminate 
both these points. 
 
In contrast, there are some significant differences between good and bad performing 
countries when we come to changes.   16 
1.  While good performers do not grow particularly fast, they do avoid negative growth, 
whereas a number of the poor performers ( Ukraine, Zambia, Moldova, Congo (DRC) 
and CAR, show negative growth.  
2.  While they are broadly similar in terms of average income distribution over the 
period, good HDI performers show better change in inequality over time.  Three show 
increasing equality, compared with just one (Zambia) among the poor performers. 
3.  Again on poverty (for which data over the whole period are deficient), the Human 
Poverty Index shows an improvement among every good performer. The majority of 
poor performers also show some improvement, but generally less, and some show a 
worsening.  
4.  On secondary school enrolment, all countries show an improvement, but the 
improvement on average is greater among the good performers. 
5.  On female/male enrolment ratios, again the good performers improve more than the 
poor performers (except among the high HDI category where the levels are near 
100% in 1970). 
 
In order to explore patterns of country behaviour and typologies Tables 2 and 3 show how 
individual countries perform across the indicators.  We chose what we considered 
reasonable cutoff points for each indicator, to decide ‘good’ performance (shown by 1), 
bad performance (shown by -1), and intermediate or moderate performance (shown by 0). 
The cutoff points are shown in each of the tables.   17 
Table 2: Country behaviour on average achievements on levels 1970-2007, for good performing countries 
  Soc expend. (H+E)% GDP. combined enrolment F:M  p. cap inc  Gini  Income poverty HPI* 
 Criteria  >8%; 4% or less  >75%  >.9; <.7 >$10,000;<$5000   <.4 good; >.5 bad <10%;>50%  <10%;>50% 
High HDI               
Mexico  1  1  1  1  -1  1  1 
Chile  0  1  1  1  -1  1  1 
Panama  Na  0  1  1  -1  0  1 
 Medium HDI                     
Laos  -1  0  0  -1  1  0  0 
Indonesia  0  0  1  -1  1                 na  0 









Low HDI                      
Nepal  -1  0  1  -1  0  -1  0 
Bangladesh  -1  0  1  -1  1  -1  0 
Benin  0  0  0  -1       Na  0  0   19 
Table 3: Country behaviour on average achievements on levels, 1970-2007 for poor performing countries 
  Soc expend. (H+E),% GDP combined enrolment F:M  p. cap inc  Gini  Income poverty HPI* 
Criteria 
 
>8%; 4% or less  >75%  >.9; <.7 >$10,000;<$5000 <.4 good; >.5 bad <10%;>50%  <10%;>50% 
High HDI               
Ukraine  1  1  1  0  1  1  1 
Trin and Tob Na  0  1  1  0  1  1 
Kazakhstan  0  1  1  1  1  1  1 
Medium HDI              
Zambia  0  0  1  -1  -1  -1  0 
Uzbekistan  +1  +1  1  -1  1  0  1 
Moldova  1  0  1  -1  0  0  1   20 
 
 
Low HDI               
Congo Dem  Na  0  0  -1  Na  -1  0 
CAR  -1  -1  0  -1  Na  -1  0 
Uganda  Na  0  1  -1  -1  -1  0   21 
































High HDI countries 
   Mexico  1  1  -1*  0  0  0 
   Chile  -1  1  -1*  0  -1  -1** 
   Panama  Na  1  -1*  0  -1  0 
Medium   HDI countries           
   Laos  1  1  1  1  -1  +1 
   Indonesia  Na  1  0*  1  +1  0 
   Tunisia  0  1  1  1  +1  +1 
Low HDI countries           
    Nepal  Na  1  1  0  +1  +1   22 
   Bangladesh  1  0  1  0  0  +1 
   Benin  Na  Na  1  -1  Na  +1 
*was very high at the beginning 
 
 
































High HDI countries           
Ukraine  0  1  -1*  -1  -1  Na 
Trin and Tob  Na  1  -1*  0  +1  -1 
Kazakhstan  Na  -1*  -1*  0  -1  Na 
 Medium HDI countries           
Zambia  -1  1  0  -1  +1  -1   23 
Uzbekistan  Na  -1*  -1*  0  -1  Na 
Moldova  Na  -1*  -1*  -1  -1  Na 
 Low HDI countries           
Congo Dem  Na  0  0  -1  Na  0 
CAR  -1  Na  0  -1  Na  -1 
Uganda  Na  0  1  0  +1  +1 
*was very high at the beginning 
* was very low at beginning 
 
 
Typologies of success 
Among the successful countries, all did well on educational enrolment, female/male primary 
enrolment ratios and poverty reduction changes, except those which had already had 
exceptionally good performance at the beginning of the period. There was a more mixed 
performance on growth and on income distribution. Analysis of the successful shortfall 
reduction countries suggests a number of routes to success are possible: 
1.  Countries with high HDI and high per capita income can achieve success despite poor 
(and even worsening) income distribution if they have good or moderate social 
expenditure and good education indicators. Examples are Mexico, Chile and Panama.   24 
2.  Medium and low HDI countries can overcome their adverse initial conditions via 
improvements in social expenditure,  education indicators and income distribution, 
even with moderate or poor growth, like Nepal or Bangladesh. 
3.  Another case is to succeed, like Tunisia, through high social expenditure ratios, 
combined with good growth, but with only moderate, though improving,   
distributional equity. 
4.  Finally, a combination of high growth and good distribution, like Indonesia and Laos, 
can help low-income countries to success, without high social expenditure ratios. 
 
Typology of failure   
Poor growth is the overwhelming characteristic of failure, and, in these cases, seems to 
have led to failure in the high HDI cases (Trinidad and Tobago and Kazakhstan) as well 
as medium (Ukraine), and low HDI (e.g. Zambia, Uganda and Congo Dem.)  countries.  
The interlocking causal links between HD and economic growth suggest that sustained 
failure on either is likely to lead to failure on the other (Ranis, Stewart and Ramirez 
2000).  Over a long period then, economic growth is necessary, but by no means 
sufficient, to achieve success in HD. In addition, among the high HDI countries all 
showed worsening income distribution over time, most showed poor performance on HPI 
change and experienced reductions in social expenditure ratios.  
 
5. Beyond the HDI   25 
It is now well accepted that the HDI represents a reductionist measure of HD. In earlier work, 
drawing on philosophical investigations of what constitutes the features of a ‘full’ life, we 
identified eleven dimensions in addition to those represented by the HDI (Ranis, Stewart and 
Samman 2006).
2
1.  Political rights and civil liberties as measured by Polity2 score 
  Here we take a subset of these, because of a lack of consistent and reliable 
data. We include:  
2.  Environmental sustainability as measured by the Yale Center for Environmental Law 
and Policy. 
3.  Inequality as measured by the Gini coefficient. 
4.  Community wellbeing as measured by two variables: the homicide rate and the 
incidence of violent political conflict.   
5.  Gender empowerment as measured by GEM.   
 
For each of these dimensions we look at both the levels of achievement over 1970-2005 and 
changes, wherever data are available, or for a shorter period where data is restricted.  We then 
compare our ‘good’ and ‘bad’ performers on HDI with the performance on these indicators of 
“HD beyond the HDI” to explore (a) whether countries that do well or badly on the HDI also 
do well on other indicators; and (b) the nature of divergencies, where they occur. 
 
 
                                                           
2 They were mental wellbeing; empowerment; political freedom; social relations; community wellbeing; 
inequality; work conditions; leisure conditions; economic stability; political security; environmental conditions.   26 
Average political rights index 
 
When we consider the achievements on average political rights (Figure 12), we find a mixed 
picture in the high and middle HDI categories. In the low HDI countries none of the countries 
did very well, but there were stronger political rights among the good performers than the 
bad.   A similar ambiguous picture is shown by Figure 13, indicating change in political 
rights, though here there are fewer observations. Our findings challenge the view that better 
political rights are either necessary or sufficient to generate improvements in human 
development (McGuire 2010; Przeworski et al. 2000). It supports the more ambiguous 
findings about the relationship between democracy and HD of Tsai 2006. Democracy 
provides the space for political action to promote HD, but active participation, organisation 
and struggle may be necessary to translate this into improved HD (Tsai 2006; Stewart 2010) 
 
 
Figure 12. Source Inter-University Consortium for Social and Political  Research 











































































































































Average political freedom index (Polity 2) 1970-2007, for 
best and worst HDI performers (+ 10 'most free'; - 10 
least)
high HDI medium HDI low HDI  27 
 
For Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Moldova, data only available from 1991. 
Figure 13 




Gender empowerment here is measured by the UNDP’s GEM. 
No particular relationship with GEM can be observed (Figure 14). Indeed in the high HDI 
group, Trinidad and Tobago (with a poor HDI change) has the highest achievement on GEM, 
and Moldova, also a poor performer in the medium HDI category, does best in its category on 
GEM. However, in the low HDI category the two good HDI performers do better than CAR 
(the one poor performer in the low-HDI category for which there is data).  We were unable to 















































































































































Change in Polity 2, 1970 to 2007 for best and worst HDI 
performers
high HDI medium  HDI low HDI  28 
 
 
Figure 14.  
Source: UNDP, HDRO. 
 
C. Inequality 
As noted earlier, we get a mixed  picture in terms of inequality and HDI performance (Figure 
9): the high HDI category countries with good performance have higher inequality than those 
with poor performance. This may be partly because Ukraine and Kazakhstan (poor 
performers on HDI change) have relative equality stemming from the socialist period. Still it 
remains true that the three good HDI performers – Mexico, Chile, and Panama - each have 
poor inequality, with Gini indices above 0.5. In the medium HDI group, no systematic 
differences can be noted: Laos, a good performer on HDI, is exceptionally equal, and 
Zambia, a poor performer, is exceptionally unequal, and the remainder are rather similar. In 
















































































































Average Gender Empowerment Measure value 
(1994-2005; all available years) for countries 
by best and worst HDI shortfall reduction
high HDI medium HDI low HDI  29 
(Nepal and Bangladesh) are more equal than the one poor performer (Uganda). As discussed 
earlier, there is some association between change in income distribution and HDI:  the better 
performers show more improvement in income distribution, or less worsening, than the poor 
performers. 
 
D. Homicides and the incidence of violent conflict 
We use the numbers of prosecuted homicides per 100,000 and the incidence of violent 
conflict as measures of community wellbeing, including security. The data for homicides are 
particularly suspect as they depend on reported homicides and their prosecution and 
understate actual homicides to an unknown extent. We should bear in mind that the data 




Figure 15. Source United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC). 
                                                           
3 “
The comparison of intentional homicide figures between countries and regions is, to some extent, a comparison not only of the level of intended killing of persons, but 
also of the extent to which countries and regions deem that a killing should be classified as such. In essence, societies define those killings that it perceives as acceptable 


























































































Average rates of prosecution for homicide, 1995-2005, per 
100,000 among best and worst HDI performers














0  30 
An ambiguous picture is shown in terms of levels of prosecution  of homicides (Figure 15), 
as Mexico, a good performing country, has the highest rate of insecurity, and  the second 
highest is Kazakhstan, a poor performer. But in the middle and low HDI categories, the  good 
performers have low rates, well below the poor performers. A similar pattern can be observed 
for changes in the rate of prosecution (Figure 16). 
 
 
Figure 16. Source UNODC 
 
Figures 17 and 18 show the years (and changes in years) countries experienced violent 
political conflict from 1970-2005, including both major conflict (weighted as 1 for every year 











































































































Change in rate of prosecution for intentional homicide per 
100,000 population (1995-2005; all available years) for best and 
worst HDI performers
high HDI medium HDI low HDI  31 
 
Figure 17.   
Source: Uppsala Conflict Data Programme (UCDP) 
 
There is, perhaps, a surprising lack of systematic connection between good and bad HDI 
performance and the absence or presence of conflict. None of the high HDI (either good or 
poor performers) experienced significant conflict. But in the medium HDI category, 
Indonesia (a good performer) showed very high levels of conflict and Laos also suffered in a 
serious way while among the weak performers Zambia had none and there were minor 
disturbances in Uzbekistan and Moldova. In the low HDI category, again we find Nepal and 
Bangladesh having had a significant amount of conflict, but the poor performers, DRC and 
Uganda, had much more.  These findings are probably partly due to the different types of 
conflict experienced. Indonesia for example, is recorded as having had conflict over many 
years, but these conflicts were mostly located in specific parts of the country away from the 












Years in violent 1970-2005 (1= major; 1/2 = minor) for 
best and worst HDI performers




 Moreover, as can be seen from Figure 18, with the important exception of 
Nepal, the successful countries had less conflict at the end of the period than the beginning, 
while the poor performers in Africa, all saw a big increase in conflict. 
 




This is measured by the  Environmental Sustainability Index, which was only initiated in 
2002 so there is not enough data to show a change in this index over time. In the high HDI 
category (Figure 19) every good performer has a better environmental index than the poor 
HDI performers. The opposite is true in the low HDI category. In the medium category, 
                                                           
4  Stewart, Fitzgerald et al., 2001, found that conflict that was confined to a peripheral part of the country had 
much less impact on economic and social variables than conflict that was centrally located.    33 
generally the good HDI performers do better, but Moldova (a poor HDI performer)  has a 
relatively good environmental index.  
 
Taken as a whole, this evidence confirms earlier findings (Ranis, Stewart and Samman, 
2006), that good performance on HDI does not necessarily mean that countries also perform 
well on other dimensions of Human Development.  
 
 
Figure 19.  
Source: Yale Center for Environmental Law and Policy 









































































































































Average Environmental Sustainability Index 
(all years for which data is available) 
for  best and worst HDI performers
high HDI medium HDI low HDI  34 
Table 6 shows the performance across levels of dimensions for the good and poor performers; 
and Table 7 does the same for changes. 
 



















(1); and especially 
poor (-1) 
>3 good ; 
0 or 
below 










poor   >55 good; 
,<40 bad  
High HDI, good performers 
Mexico  0  1  -1 
-1 
 
0  0 
Chile  0  0  -1  +1  0  1 
Panama  1  0  -1  -1  0  1   35 
Medium HDI good performers 
Laos  -1  na  1  Na  -1  0 
Indonesia  0  0  1  1  -1  0 
Tunisia  -1  0  0  1  0  0 
Low HDI good performers 
Nepal  0                      0  0 
                    
+1 
-1  0 
Bangladesh  0  -1  +1  +1  -1  0 
Benin  0  na  Na  Na  +1  0 
High HDI, poor performers 
Ukraine  0                      0  1  0  +1  0 
Trin and Tob  +1  1  0 
                  
Na 
+1  0 
Kazakhstan             -1                     0 
               
1                    -1 
+1              0 
Medium HDI, poor  performers 
Zambia  0  +1  -1  0  +1  0 
Uzbekistan  -1  Na  +1  Na  0  -1 
Moldova  0  -1 
              
0  0              0   36 
0 
Low HDI, poor performers 
DRC  -1  na 
             
na  Na 
-1  Na 
CAR  0  -1  Na  Na  0  0 
Uganda  0  Na  -1  0  -1  0 
 
     37 
 
Table 7: Relative achievements on some HD dimensions (changes) in good and poor 

















Change in violent 










>0.13 good; 0.1 and 
less bad 
>-0.025 










Reduction of >2  
good; 
Increase of >2  poor 
High HDI, good performers 




Chile  +1  +1  -1  0  0 
Panama  0  +1  -1  -1  0 
Medium HDI good performers 
Laos  0  Na  -1  Na  +1   38 
Indonesia  0  Na  +1  0  0 
Tunisia  -1  Na  +1  0  0 
Low HDI good performers 
Nepal  -1  Na  +1                      0 -1 
Bangladesh  -1  -1  0  0  +1 
Benin  +1  na  Na  Na  0 
High HDI, poor performers 
Ukraine  Na                      0  -1  0  0 
Trin and Tob  0  0  +1 




            
Na                     Na 
               
-1                    -1 
0 
Medium HDI, poor  performers 
Zambia  0  0  +1  0  0 
Uzbekistan  -1  Na  -1  Na  -1 
Moldova  Na  0# 
              
-+1  0 
0 
Low HDI, poor performers 
DRC  0  Na 
             
Na  -1   39 
Na 
CAR  0  Na  Na  Na  -1 
Uganda  -1  Na  -1  0  -1 
#data only available for 6 years increase = .091. 
 
Table 6 illustrates a lack of consistency across different dimensions, and little relationship 
between the non-HDI dimensions and improvement in HDI.  
We find the following types of performance: 
1.  Good  (or neutral) performance on all dimensions except for inequality and homicides 
(Latin American cases, all in the high HDI category). 
1.  Good or neutral on most dimensions except for political rights (Tunisia), violent 
conflict (Indonesia), and political rights and violent conflict (Laos); and conflict and  
GEM (Bangladesh). 
2.  The poor performing low HDI countries show predominantly negative results where 
data are available.  
The other countries show a mixed performance, with negatives and positives on a variety of 
dimensions.  
 
Contrasting good and poor performers, the relationships that might be expected do not appear 
to hold, i.e. the poor performers do not have more conflict than the good ones; the good 
performers are not less unequal in income than the poor ones; and there is not a systematic   40 
relationship between GEM and HDI performance.  The poor HDI performers do not show 
more negatives on environment, while some of the poor ones do.  There are slightly more 
negatives on political rights among the poor performers than among the good ones.   
 
Turning to change in the dimensions beyond the HDI, (Table 7), again there is not much 
consistency across dimensions. Some of the good performers on HDI, do poorly on other 
aspects including change in political rights (Nepal, Bangladesh and Tunisia), change in GEM 
(Bangladesh) change in inequality (Chile, Panama and Laos) and change in violent conflict 
(Nepal). The poor performers, however, usually do worse on change in conflict than the good 
ones, the three low HDI poor performers all being negative on this. 
 
6. Some country vignettes 
To understand the sources of success and failure in HD, it is helpful to go beyond the data, to 
attempt to obtain a better understanding of the political, historical (and other) factors behind 
decisions which led to success and failure. We therefore select six countries in this section 
which showed exceptional performance (four positive, two negative) over these years and 
provide short vignettes of their historical paths. 
 
Bangladesh 
Bangladesh is an interesting case because it appears as a worst case, from the perspective of 
best achievements on HDI, 1970-2005, but is among the best performers in terms of shortfall 
reduction in the low HDI group.  This indicates that it started from a very weak position –   41 
literacy was as low as 29% in 1980 (female only 18%);  malnutrition was over 60% in 1980, 
under 5 mortality 240 per 1,000 live births in 1970, life expectancy  was just 44 and income 
per capita in 1975 was just $150. 1970 was just before Bangladesh achieved independence, 
having suffered as the exploited eastern wing of Pakistan from 1947. The war that led to the 
split in 1971 involved a very sharp (but temporary) fall in incomes (Figure 20). 
 
It's difficult to argue that Bangladesh has been well governed since then: the first Prime 
Minister was murdered, and there has been a succession of coups; the Bangladesh 
government is also notoriously corrupt –  it was worst on  Transparency International’s 
corruption index in 2005. In 2009 it was 139 out of a total of 180 countries.  On political 
rights, Bangladesh has fluctuated between 3 and 5, according to the Freedom House index 
(where 1 is most free and 7 least).  Yet despite this unpromising context, Bangladesh has 
made consistent economic and social progress since 1970.  Per capita economic growth, after 
some fluctuations in the 1970s, has been positive and increasing, reaching between 5 and 6% 
p.a. by the 2000s (Figure 20) . This growth was based on rising investment (gross fixed 
capital formation increased from 5% in the 1970s to over 20% by 2005), and accelerating 
exports, which rose from below 5% of GDP in the mid-1980s to 18% by the 2000s . Export 
growth largely consisted of textiles, which expanded their share of total exports dramatically. 
At the same time there was marked progress in education and health. Education expenditure 
as a proportion of GDP was just 1.1% in 1975 but rose to 2.7% by 2005, while the share of 
primary education in that total also rose slightly. There was an 83% improvement in adult 
literacy 1980-2005, and female literacy increased by 166%.  All educational indicators 
improved, with school life expectancy rising from 5 years in 1975 to 8.5 years in 2005, by 
which time female and male life expectancy were equal.  There was also a big rise in 
immunisation rates, in access to improved water sources, and an improvement in births   42 
attended by skilled health staff, though the rate remains very low at below 20% of births 
(Figure 21). The estimated incidence of HIV/AIDS is very low (0.1%) (Data on this from 
CIA World Fact Book). 
 
This economic progress was accompanied by a consistently relatively equal income 
distribution, with the share of the bottom 20% hovering around 9% (in Chile in contrast that 
share is between 3 and 4%).  The Gini coefficient which was 0.336 in 1996 declined to 0.332 
by 2005. There has been a substantial fall in malnutrition rates since the early 1990s. Child 
mortality rates fell to around 68 per 1,000 and life expectancy rose to around 65 by 2005 
(Figure 22). 
 
Yet this is not a case of an effective and egalitarian state promoting HD. Indeed, one observer 
noted: 
 ‘The patronization by successive governments of a criminal class, who 
have become instrumental to the functioning of our principal political parties has 
brought the machinery of law enforcement into contempt…The days when bureaucrat 
were driven by a sense of public mission, built on expectations of professional 
recognition and advancement, remain in distant memory. In such circumstances the 
administrative system is rarely capable of implementing any policy and is largely seen 
as an agency for rent seeking from the helpless citizens... The health care and 
education services have degenerated to a point where it is a misnomer to term them as 
a public service.’ (Sobhan 2002: 6). 
   43 
Since Bangladesh gained independence from Pakistan in 1971, the government has oscillated 
between authoritarian military domination and democracy, and in the democratic phases, 
between two political parties each of which aims to prevent the other from advancing 
governance effectively (Kabir 1999; Rahmin 1997; Ahmed 1995). Despite an apparently 
rather dysfunctional state, progress occurred largely due to two types of non-state actors: first 
an enormously enterprising and extensive set of NGOs; and secondly, a dynamic private 
sector, especially in garments and textiles. 
 
Two major institutions - BRAC and the Grameen Bank - supplemented by many others, have 
extended credit to millions of the poor, especially women, and provided education and other 
services (|Lovell, 1992; Hulme and Mooore, 2008; Nath 1997; Rohde 2005; Holcomb 1995; 
Bornstein 2005). The Grameen Bank lends to over 7 million people, of whom over 90% are 
poor women; it has also moved into other activities including telecommunications and 
garments production. BRAC claims to cover 110 million people including health and 
educational programmes and social enterprises as well as micro-credit.  
 
The second important set of non-state actors are small and medium-scale entrepreneurs, many 
of whom had little previous entrepreneurial experience, who seized the opportunities to 
expand low-cost textile and garments production offered by the Multifibre Agreement 
initially, and, despite pessimistic prognoses, sustained efficient production for the low-quality 
end of Western markets even after this agreement ended in 2005 (Islam 2001; Erfan 2004; 
Quddus and Rashid 2000).  Very low wages (less than half those of China and well below 
other countries in the region) and some domestic tax incentives helped the expansion. From 
1978, exports of garments grew from $1 million to $8billion in 2006 (Ahmed, 2009).    44 
 
These two actors –  locally initiated and managed NGOs and local small and medium 
entrepreneurs - supported by the state, at least intermittently, made possible the virtuous and 
mutually supportive cycle of relatively egalitarian economic growth and progress in Human 
Development.   
 












































































































   
























































































measles (% of children ages 12-
23 months)
Bangladesh Improved water
source (% of population with
access)
Bangladesh Births attended by
skilled health staff (% of total)  46 
Indonesia 
Indonesia is one of the best performers on shortfall reduction in the middle HDI group.  Like 
Bangladesh its performance is particularly impressive given the large size of the population 
(Indonesia’s population is estimated at 100m in the1970s and 225 m. in 2007).  In the case of 
Indonesia, its archipelagic character which includes multiple ethnic groups and languages has 
increased the challenge. Rich oil and gas resources, first discovered in the 19th century, 
however, provided the potential resources to finance rising HD, but also brought with it the 
usual problems associated with managing the economic and resource distribution of abundant 
high value natural resources. The 35 years since 1970 saw both economic and social 
transformation. Economic growth per  capita on average was 4.3% p.a.
5
 
 (Figure 23) (the 
highest of all the good shortfall reduction countries), while Indonesia maintained a relatively 
equal income distribution with a Gini of 0.37 on average, 1980-2005. At the same time it 
made steady social progress. The immunisation rate, births attended by skilled health staff 
and improved water sources all increased fairly steadily over the period for which there are 
data (Figure 24);  the gross primary enrolment rate was less than 50% in 1970 and rose to 
88% by 2005, while the female/male ratio in primary and secondary schools was 0.95.  
Nonetheless, in many respects Indonesia still lags behind other S.E. Asian countries, it still 
has not achieved 100% primary enrolment and has a relatively high child mortality rate of 31 
(Figure 25) 
What was behind this considerable success? We need to divide Indonesia’s progress over this 
period into two: the New Order which came to power under Suharto in 1966 and ended in 
                                                           
5 Growth in Indonesia was estimated by Statistics Indonesia 4.5% for 2009 during the global financial crisis 
which affected neighbouring countries.   47 
1998, following the economic collapse associated with the East Asian financial crisis; and the 
reformasi or democratic era which began with Suharto’s resignation and free elections in 
1999.  
 
In the New Order period an authoritarian government supported the economic and social 
transformation of the country, using oil and gas resources to finance infrastructure, especially 
through the INPRES (Presidential Instructions). On the economic side, despite the significant 
role of natural resources, Indonesia supported diversification with infrastructural investments 
and generous credit policies. Both rice production, assisted by the green revolution, 
investment in irrigation and fertiliser subsidies, and labour-intensive industry, flourished – in 
strong contrast to many oil-rich countries. Indonesia was able to make use of its cheap labour 
force to expand textile production using oil  revenues to promote investment.
6
 
 This was 
probably facilitated by the fact that oil production peaked in the mid-1970s and by 2006 
Indonesia had become a net importer of oil. But the government also managed the exchange 
rate to avoid the high value that typically obtains in resource-rich countries. Indonesia’s non-
hydrocarbon development – the focus on rice – a labour-intensive crop, much produced by 
small farmers - and on labour-intensive textiles led to the fairly equal income distribution 
observed.   
Political factors also underlay the success.  Lewis (2007) argues that the growth and 
development success of Indonesia can be explained mainly in institutional terms.  He 
contends that due to the fairly compact national elite, the durable coalition between the power 
                                                           
6 ‘One fifth of the government’s investment expenditures during the 1970s oil boom went into agriculture— 
compared to 2% for Nigeria (World Bank 2000: 3)’ (Ascher 2008: 25).   48 
blocks of the military, and capable technocrats, Suharto signalled ‘credible commitments to 
investors through a combination of formal policies and informal patronage, even though 
many state institutions remained weak throughout his rule’. whereas ‘the failure to construct a 
more effective institutional architecture rendered the system vulnerable as the economy 
expanded and integrated more extensively into global markets’ and, with the onset of the 
Asian Financial Crisis, in part led to his downfall (2007: 6-7).  In the late 1990s, as Suharto 
aged (signalling to military factions that the presidency would soon be available – Bertrand 
2004), his control weakened among the once cohesive military and civilian elite and among 
the populace. The discontent amongst civilian groups with limited political freedoms 
culminated in the political unrest leading to his downfall, which had previously been kept at 
bay by military control and by the New Order’s delivery of growth and improvements in 
standards of living.  
 
During the New Order, expansion of primary health care and education was financed by 
INPRES which facilitated targeted poverty alleviation programmes for what were known as 
‘disadvantaged areas’. The decentralized distribution of government expenditure at that time 
has been shown to have been equalising in terms of regional distribution (Ravallion 1988), 
but at the same time programmes such as transmigration, which led to the relocation of 
(mainly) Javanese from the most densely populated areas  to the outer islands, created 
communal tensions (Brown 2008). Furthermore, the redistribution of natural resource wealth 
from oil rich areas such as Aceh and Papua may have improved HD in other parts of the 
country, but this did not translate into higher standards of living for local Acehnese and 
Papuans further stimulating separatist tensions in these regions.  In fact in 2004, Aceh was 
still ranked the fourth poorest province in the country in terms of poverty rates (Ascher 
2008).      49 
The financial crisis of the late 1990s, shortly followed by a political crisis, led to a major 
recession, with GDP falling by more than 10%; while growth recovered after the transition to 
democracy, it did not reach its previous rate, although it still attained  5%- 6% p.a. from 
2001. Investment from abroad was deterred by the political uncertainties resulting from the 
popular uprising against the New Order and gross capital formation has not reached the high 
levels (30%) achieved by the end of the New Order.    
 
The democratic era brought a radically different set of social policies: a programme of 
unconditional cash transfers replaced fuel subsidies, subsequently replaced by conditional 
transfers and there was  a  massive and radical decentralisation initiated in 2001. Local 
government expenditures in 2006 were twice as much as the total central government 
expenditure (Ascher 2008; World Bank 2007). While social sector expenditure had been 
relatively modest in the New Order era, it has accelerated since, with both health and 
education expenditure more than doubling in real terms between 2001 and 2006 (Ascher 
2008). Moreover, the priority ratio has almost certainly improved, with decentralisation; 
primary and secondary education  are estimated to account for 87% of total education 
spending (Ascher from World Bank 2007).  In the health sector, the large, although declining, 
share of provinces and districts in the total (66% in 2001; 55% in 2007) ensured that the share 
of primary health care was high. 
 
Throughout the initial years of the reform, there was consistent public pressure on the state 
from civil society groups to open up political freedoms and deliver poverty alleviation 
programmes to offset the effects of the financial crisis.  NGOs, the press, students and trade 
unions camped outside the national parliament as legislation was under consideration to   50 
ensure that minimum wages were introduced, labour laws were revised to allow for freedom 
of association, and the role of the military was rolled back.  Mass public rallies ensued when 
economic reforms appeared likely to have dire impacts on the poor during the financial crisis 
and in the initial years of the reform, stimulating the introduction of social safety net 
programmes for health and education and the cash transfer programmes mentioned above.  
Relatively peaceful elections of 1999 and 2004 saw the opposition take power, relaxing the 
stranglehold of New Order elites, leading to greater public accountability of politicians.   
  
In summary, Indonesia’s success in improving HD under Suharto was partly driven by the 
high rate of growth and its nature (broadly labour-intensive), supported by good distribution 
in spite of relatively low social expenditure ratios. Post- Suharto, we see the operation of a 
(partially) democratic state, where supporting basic services and reducing poverty become 
political necessities. In this era slower (though still high) growth has been accompanied by 
greater expenditure on the social sectors and on poverty relief via cash transfers. The radical 
decentralisation is likely to have assisted the improved total expenditures on social services 
and improved priority ratios.  
   51 
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Zambia is classified as one of the three worst countries, in terms of shortfall reduction in the 
medium HDI category. Its middle HDI status in 1990 stemmed from the relatively high 
income from copper and its use to extend services to the population. Its poor performance on 
HDI subsequently, meant that by the end of the period it fell into the low HDI category. This 
failure is basically due to a combination of very weak economic progress and a high 
incidence of HIV-AIDS. But political factors were also behind this failure – these effectively 
insulated  policy from pressures from the people for poverty reduction and human 
development. 
 
Zambia is heavily dependent on copper exports and failed to diversify significantly over this 
period.  Indeed, industry’s share of GDP was 60% in 1970 and had fallen to 25% by 2000 (it   53 
subsequently rose).  Sharp fluctuations in the terms of trade (Figure 27) have been mirrored 
by fluctuations in GDP (Figure 26), and growth was frequently negative over this period.  
Income per capita rose on the basis of good copper prices and import-substitution up to 1982, 
but Zambia was badly hit by the 1980s debt crisis and terms of trade deterioration in the 
1990s (Figure 27), and incomes fell sharply to only about one-third of their peak. Moreover 
income distribution was highly unequal, with the bottom 20% of the population securing 
between 3 and 4% of total income for most of the period and the Gini at over 0.6 , the highest 
of all the countries observed in this paper.  Investment fell to as little as 11% of GDP by the 
end of the 1980s, and then recovered gradually and was 22% in 2008, still well below its 
level in the 1970s. Per capita income stagnated in the 1990s, and started to rise again (with 
booming copper prices) from 2003.  The economic failure, which was a fundamental factor 
behind the poor HD performance, cannot be attributed only to heavy dependence on copper 
and poor terms of trade, since other natural resource rich countries managed to diversify, to 
sustain growth and to improve their HD (like Indonesia and Chile).  The poor economic 
performance meant that service delivery stagnated (Figure 28), and indeed there were severe 
cuts in the 1980s. The primary school completion rate which had reached 81% in 1980 had 
fallen to 60% by 2002, but subsequently rose again to 88% by 2007.  Moreover, very high 
poverty rates resulted, with over 60% of the population falling below the $1.25 a day 
standard. 
 
The weak economic performance was compounded by a very high rate of HIV-AIDs (Figure 
29) – an estimated 16% of the adult population was affected by the mid-1990s. Since then the 
epidemic has been contained but over 15% of the population are still HIV-positive. There are, 
of course, huge implications for HD from such a high rate of infection, not only in terms of 
deaths but also for skills, labour productivity, child support and so on. Many prominent civil   54 
servants and politicians, for example, died; and there was a massive increase in the number of 
orphans.   The rise in child mortality from the mid-1980s (Figure 30), with a parallel fall in 
life expectancy over this period, is due to this epidemic.  However, while the Zambian HD 
failure, then, is easy to explain, there are also some grounds for optimism, in that economic 
growth has resumed, education rates are improving, and the HIV-AIDs epidemic has been 
contained.  
 
Zambia has seen a democratic transition during this period and the peaceful transfer of power 
through elections. Yet this made little difference to economic management, or to the 
commitment to human development.  The level of corruption remains high, according to 
Transparency International, which places Zambia 99
th in the world (of a total of 180) in 2009, 
an improvement on 2001 results when Zambia was 75
th of 91 countries.  The title of an 
analysis of aid sums up the situation: ‘Aid and poverty reduction in Zambia: Mission 
Unaccomplished’ (Saasa with Carlsson  2001).  
 
The nature of Zambian politics is an important element underlying this failure.  As early as 
1974,  Molteno pointed out that political parties in Zambia tended to adopt ‘sectional’ (or 
ethnic) cleavages to mobilise support, basically because this was the most effective way, 
since class did not unite so many people so effectively given the divisions between peasants 
and urban workers, as well as between formal and informal urban workers. According to him, 
national leaders ‘set out to stimulate and even create sectional identifications among the 
masses’ in order to gain support (Molteno, 1974: 77).  During the single party era, dominated 
by President Kaunda, Bates and Collier argue that urban support was more important than 
rural to sustain Presidential power, though at that stage poverty was overwhelmingly rural   55 
and hence policies favoured the urban areas and especially the elite (Bates and Collier, 2005). 
Moreover, within the single party (UNIP),   ‘those seeking high office …were not constrained 
by electoral mechanisms within the Party; they did not have to champion the interests of 
those at its lower reaches’ (Bates and Collier, 1995:125).   
 
Once democracy was reinstated, Zambian politics returned to the sectarian pattern, as Posner 
(2005) shows. Again ethnic loyalties were used to garner votes, Posner argued, pointing to 
evidence from Zambian political parties and voting patterns,  that in a majoritarian 
democracy, particular coalitions and identities are created so as to produce sufficient support 
to win elections (Posner 2005). This type of politics leads to divisions within  classes 
(including the poor), resulting in patrimonial rather than ideological politics. As Eberlai 
shows in a detailed account of donor politics and the ineffectiveness of PRSPs to deliver pro-
poor policies, in Zambia such a system has been fuelled by aid ( Eberlai 2005). Accordingly, 
the PRSP process in Zambia effectively bypassed parliament and communities, consulting 
only organised civil society, and only on somewhat peripheral issues. He concludes that ‘as 
long as donors  are fuelling and thereby stabilising neo-patrimonial systems, genuine 
developments towards democratic societies ruled by elites in the interests of the poor will 
hardly occur’ (Eberlai 2005: 112).   Consequently, there is ‘an apparent disconnect between 
people’s needs and the way the country’s affairs are run’ (Abdi and Shizha and Ellis, 2010, 
abstract). Yet evidence suggests that it is where groups of underprivileged people unite and 
press for political change that progressive pro-human development change occurs (McGuire; 
Stewart, 2010).    56 
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Chile represents an interesting case of success, which saw progress in Human Development 
both during democratic and authoritarian periods.  Moreover, over the entire period, 1970-
2005, this is a country which demonstrated that it is possible to do well on HDI reduction 
with modest and fluctuating growth (Figure 31) and high income inequality, due to the 
beneficial impact of education and health-related expenditure patterns, with  a social 
expenditure ratio (at 6.3%),  a total education enrolment ratio  (at 82%) with a difference in 
the  female/male primary enrolment rate of only 1%.
7
                                                           
7 James McGuire found that “wealthier leading to healthier” works best for levels of income, less well for 
changes - i.e. the periods of faster growth rates of GDP per capita in Chile between 1960 and 2009 were 
associated with slower rates of decline in infant mortality rates.   
   The fact that Chile achieved a much 
lower level of child mortality than would be expected by its level of  GDP per capita (Figure 
31) indicates that factors other than income have been at work, including the country’s long 
democratic experience prior to the 1973 coup and its relatively high initial level of per capita   59 
income and life expectancy.  Moreover, throughout it has placed great premium on maternal 
and child health (shown by its very high rates of skilled personnel attendance at births (Figure 
32).  
 
What makes the case especially interesting, and in some way comparable with Indonesia, is 
that the long period under observation needs to be divided into two epochs, the 17 years, 
1973-1990, under the military dictatorship of Pinochet, and the subsequent 15 years under the 
democratic leadership of the Concertacion.  Top civil servants, aided by the “Chicago boys”, 
forged economic and social policy.  During the authoritarian political rule, the Pinochet 
government generally pursued market oriented and monetarist economic policies.   
The Pinochet period saw a cut in social expenditure, but decentralisation and strict targeting 
of programmes to the health and education of children allowed continued progress in major 
health and educational indicators. In 1980 Pinochet transferred the responsibility for 
education and health from the centre to the municipios but without providing the needed 
accompanying financial resource transfers. Between 1977 and 1988, the share of government 
expenditure going to the social sectors fell from 21.4% to 15.5%. However, the social priority 
ratio (the share going to pre-tertiary education and primary health care) rose sharply from 
42.5% to 72.7%, partly due to a major reduction in public support for Universities and partly 
to decentralisation (Stewart and Ranis, 1994). Education expenditure as a share of public 
expenditure fell from 22% in 1970 to 10% in 1990. Comparisons of expenditure patterns by 
municipios  and the central government indicate that municipios spend a much higher 
proportion of revenue on HD-promoting activities (Ibid). Pinochet also abolished the rural 
neighbourhood associations in existence before the coup. The net effect of the changes was to 
increase maternal and infant health care targeted on the poor and basic education.  This   60 
appears to have compensated for  a high level of income inequality.    During the 
subsequent post-1990 democratic epoch, elections at the local government level were 
reinstituted, as were civil society organisations generally, including the neighbourhood 
associations, an example of genuinely indigenous NGO activity.  Growth rates were 
explosive initially during the democratic era while moderating somewhat in recent years. 
Both taxation as a share of GDP and the share of social expenditure in total public 
expenditure also rose during the democratic era. Revenue (excluding grants) rose from 22.5% 
to 27% of GDP between 1990 and 2007, and the share of education rose from 10% to 18%. 
More limited data on health expenditures indicate that this also rose. The government also 
introduced substantial cash transfer programmes directed towards the poor. The resumed 
growth, together with these social programmes led to continued progress on human 
development, despite unsatisfactory levels of income inequality (although there has been 
some reduction in inequality  during the past two decades)  (Bravo and Contreras  2004; 
Cowan and De Gregorio 1996; Engel,. Galetovic and Raddatz 1997).   
Chile’s heavy dependency on copper for its domestic revenue as well as export earnings 
continues to be viewed as a problem but, unlike the instance of many other bonanza cases, 
Chile’s foreign exchange proceeds have been protected via their placement in a sovereign 
wealth fund “lock box,” earning 7% annually and deployed counter-cyclically.  Overall, it is 
no exaggeration to say that Chile has been the “poster child” of Latin American development 
in recent years.  It has consistently maintained a high female/male enrolment ratio and high 
overall education expenditure ratios – even though the quality of public education is suspect – 
and has achieved a reputation for outstanding innovation in generating both growth and 
expenditures to support advances in human development.  It has also been a good or 
moderate performer on most dimensions of “HD beyond the HDI” – with the somewhat 
surprising exception of gender empowerment.  Chile may be viewed as a good example of a   61 
country achieving success despite poor income distribution when a relatively high income per 
head is accompanied by some combination of good social expenditure and priority ratios.  
 
Chile has a long history of giving priority to Human Development, partly due to early 
democratisation. From a political perspective, it is of interest that basic health and education 
received continued support during the non-democratic era. This has been attributed to strong 
public expectations of good service provision, ‘influenced by many decades of previous 
democratic or pro-democratic experience’ (McGuire 2010:278).  
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Laos 
Laos appears as a relative success story, in terms of  the HDI shortfall reduction criterion, 
surprising in light of its involvement in the Vietnam War and the civil war that followed, 
which left high levels of  poverty and poor infrastructure, as well as its landlocked status and 
small population (Bird and Hill 2010).  It demonstrates that egalitarian  income distribution, 
accompanied by good growth from the 1990s (of 5% or more) (Figure 34), can overcome 
high rates of poverty and malnutrition, low levels of per capita income ($765 in 2008) and 
education, a very low  social expenditure ratio  and a poor (though improving) ratio of 
female/male secondary enrolment.   
 
As a landlocked country, heavily bombed during the Vietnam War, lacking infrastructure and 
skilled manpower, it has nevertheless managed to achieve prodigious (over 30%) investment 
rates, undoubtedly contributing to its high per capita income growth rate.  With 80% of the 
population still rural, this growth is fueled by gold and copper exports plus a booming, if still 
small, industrial sector.  As a single party communist country, initially dominated by Vietnam 
and subsequently tied closely to the Soviet Union, it has responded pragmatically to changes 
in the world situation.  In 1986 substantial liberalization took place. Consequently Laos now 
sports a 30% export ratio, booming tourism, anticipates becoming a member of the WTO and 
expects to graduate from the UN’s list of least developed countries by 2020 (Andersson, 
Engvall and Kokko 2007; Fane 2006) It remains closely tied economically to Thailand and 
foreign aid still supports 80% of its public investment and 40% of total public expenditure. 
Moreover, the rural areas remain very poor, the majority being subsistence farmers, many 
practicing shifting cultivation. It is widely believed that the land titling programmes, adopted 
in the late 1990s with the support of the World Bank, have worsened poverty for many   64 
without improving productivity (UNDP 2001; Moizo 2004; Nilsson and Victor 2004). While 
income distribution remained egalitarian up to 2002, with the Gini at 0.33, this may change as 
the impacts of land allocation policies and of expanding mineral production are realised.  
 
Laos has a low revenue ratio (at 13% in 2007), although the share of education has been 
rising within this total. Nonetheless, education expenditure remains at just 2% of GDP. 
However, the 1990s saw big improvements in service coverage, especially immunisation, 
leading to an acceleration in the decline in child mortality (Figures 35 and 36).  Corruption 
levels are high. Nonetheless, Laos is performing reasonably well on most of the “beyond the 
HDI” dimensions, with the notable exception of political rights.  
 































Figure 29   65 
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Kazakhstan 
Kazakhstan represents a medium HDI failure case according to our measure of progress.  
Having declared its independence from a disintegrating Soviet Union in 1991, its Communist 
heritage can still be seen in its good distribution and high education levels.  Secondary 
education  has been  compulsory since 1995.  Over the period as a whole, Kazakhstan 
experienced a moderate social expenditure ratio (at 5%) but a very good female/male 
educational enrollment ratio (at 1.1).  However, it is clear that the shock of the transition from 
being a part of the Soviet empire to independence caused severe distortions and trade 
disequilibria, with traded goods declining and non-traded goods on the rise (Olcott 2002).  At 
the time of independence Kazakhstan was the state most dependent on Russia, with 
Kazakhstan’s industries fully integrated with those of the Soviet Union.  Supply chains ran 
north to south between Russia and Kazakhstan.   The sudden shock of economic separation 
consequently led to a severe set-back in economic growth (Figure 37) which, in turn, 
culminated in a worsening in service coverage (Figure 38), and a negative impact on the 
country’s human development performance, including, for example, slightly falling life 
expectancy levels and a slowdown in the prior improvement in child mortality (Figure 39).  
Hyperinflation occurred after government price controls were removed, and real wages, 
pensions and savings all fell substantially.  Real wages fell substantially in the post-transition 
decade.   Income distribution worsened, with the Gini moving from 0.36 in 1988 to 0.4 in 
2007, while the share of education expenditure in GDP fell. 
 
No doubt also contributing to Kazakhstan’s growth rate decline was the post independence 
exodus of substantial talented minority populations forced to settle in the region during the 
World War II Stalin era and now subject to policies promoting Kazakh heritage.    67 
Kazakhstan’s population, already relatively sparse, actually fell between 1989 and 2002.   
Consequently, a combination of poor per capita income growth and a decline in social 
expenditure ratios, as well as a deterioration in income distribution succeeded in negating its 
relatively high per capita income levels, not to speak of its prodigious natural resource 
bonanza in oil and natural gas which has led to exceedingly high investment and export 
ratios.  The country is the recipient of the highest per capita foreign direct investment flows 
of all the former Soviet states. All this led to its present, although almost certainly temporary, 
adverse placement as a failure case.  Growth recovered from around 2000, as did service 
provision, which is likely to lead to progress in HD.   
   
With respect to the “beyond the HDI” dimensions, Kazakhstan, basically a post-Communist 
dictatorship, does not perform well on political rights or on security.  Despite initial flirtation 
with democratization Kazakhstan has become increasingly authoritarian (Cummings 2005).   
None of the elections since independence have been judged free or fair by international 
observers.  Mr. Nazarbaev won re-election as president in December 2005 and secured 
amendments to the constitution virtually guaranteeing him the presidency for life. Corruption 
levels are high, including the police and judiciary.  Kazakhstan is de jure a unitary state but, 
in response to its pronounced ethnic diversity Kazakhs form 53% of the population, Russians 
30%), in practice there is a good deal of decentralization.    68 
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Figure 31 
Source: WDI   69 































Summary and Conclusions 
   
The aim of this paper was to ascertain whether we could observe systematic patterns of 
policy related to success and failure on the HDI; and how far success or failure on HDI was 
related to other, broader dimensions of HD. 
 
We identified the three countries which had performed best over time, 1970-2007, within the 
three 1990 HDI categories (high, medium and low), adopting both HDI shortfall reduction 
and HDI growth methods – which in fact identified the same set of countries. This approach 
helps to allow for differing initial conditions, and, in our view, provides a much better 
measure of success or failure than comparing the entire set of countries, given the different   70 
starting points of countries. The resulting list of countries is obviously and purposely 
different from an undifferentiated list of best performers among all developing countries.   
 
Having identified the countries, we then explored how far in the best and the worst countries 
there was an association of success and failure on HDI with a number of variables (six in 
number) associated in the literature with human development outcomes.  Our main 
conclusion is that there are no unique patterns leading to success or failure but that there are 
alternative paths to either a positive or negative outcome.   
 
Characteristics and typologies of good progress over time  
 
Certain characteristics were common to all success cases: these were good or moderate 
educational enrolment ratios; good or moderate female/male enrolment ratios; and good or 
moderate HPI. 
 
Emerging typologies of successful progress in HDI: 
The three inputs into success appear to be  growth, social expenditure ratios and income 
distribution.  The successful countries showed different combinations of performance on 
these. 
1.  Countries with high HDI and high per capita income can achieve success despite poor 
(and even worsening) income distribution if they have good or moderate social 
expenditure and good education indicators. Examples are Mexico, Chile and Panama.   71 
2.  Medium and low HDI countries can overcome their adverse conditions via 
improvements in social expenditure, education indicators  and income distribution, 
even with moderate or poor growth, like Nepal or Bangladesh. 
3.  Another case is to succeed, like Tunisia, through high social expenditure ratios, 
combined with good growth, but with only moderate, though improving,   
distributional equity. 
4.  Finally, a combination of high growth and good distribution, like Indonesia and Laos, 
can help low-income countries to success, even without high social expenditure ratios. 
 
 Characteristics and typologies of cases of weak progress over time: 
 
Certain characteristics were common to all weak cases: these were poor or moderate 
economic growth; and, surprisingly, exceptional or moderate female/male enrolment ratios; 
likewise, against expectations, all the weak cases had good or moderate HPI. 
 
Emerging typologies of weak progress in HDI: 
 
1.  Low income countries with weak growth, poor distribution and high poverty (Zambia, 
Congo Dem and CAR – although data on income distribution are lacking).   72 
2.  Transition countries where economic, institutional and demographic disruptions led to 
weak progress despite high incomes, good distribution and good or moderate 
enrolment rates (Ukraine, Moldova, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan).  
 
With respect to changes over time, it seems clear that moderate, but not spectacular, income 
growth is essential for success in each category of countries. It also appears that moderate 
social expenditure ratios and good female/male enrolment ratios are usually necessary to 
generate success, but not sufficient as they were also found among some poor performers.  
Having good income distribution seems to be especially important for low and middle 
income countries.   Countries with high incomes per head can achieve success despite poor 
distribution if they have good or moderate social expenditure ratios and education variables; 
among low income countries a good distribution of income seems to be important for success 
in some countries, even if they have only moderate growth and moderate or even low social 
expenditure ratios.  
 
As for the typology of failure, poor growth over a period as long as 35 years can overcome 
most other more favourable conditions and lead to failure. This endorses the view (Ranis, 
Stewart, Ramirez, 2000) that sustained success on HD requires success on the economic side 
to support growth in HD expenditures, as well as specific policies designed to promote HD.   
At least moderate economic growth seems necessary, although not sufficient, for long-term 
success.  However, countries with good growth are not necessarily especially good  HD 
performers. In our small sample, for example, Trinidad and Tobago had the highest growth 
and yet was a poor performer. Sustained failure on either growth or distribution is likely to 
drag the HDI down.     73 
The one condition that appeared to be both necessary and sufficient for success over time was 
a moderate level of growth in per capita incomes, with good performers having good growth 
relative to poor performers. Apart from that it seemed that different combinations of variables 
led to success. And necessary, but not sufficient, shared by all good performers, but also 
many poor ones, appeared to be a good female to male primary enrolment ratio. 
 
Beyond the HDI 
We subsequently turned to country performance with respect to important dimensions of 
human development  beyond the HDI, including indicators of political rights, gender 
empowerment, equality, security (individual and collective) and the environment, looking 
both at average levels of achievement and, where data allowed, changes.   
 
We found no systematic patterns of performance. However, the following types of 
performance emerge: 
 
1.  Good or average achievements on all dimensions except for inequality (Chile); 
political rights (Tunisia); and collective violence (Indonesia).   
2.  Good or average achievements on all dimensions except for income inequality and 
homicides (Mexico and Panama). 
3.  The low HDI poor performers show negatives on most aspects for which there are 
data, being consistently negative on communal conflict (and its change over time), 
and mostly negative on political rights.     74 
The evidence indicates that good performance on HDI does not necessarily imply good 
performance on other dimensions of human development.  No relationship was found 
between progress on HDI and levels or changes in political rights. Nor could anything 
systematic be found in terms of a relationship between good and bad performance on levels 
and changes in homicides, collective conflict, the environment or inequality. For example, the 
extremes of high homicide rates are represented by Mexico, a good  performing country in 
the high HDI category, and  Kazakhstan, a weak performer also in the high HDI category, 
both showing a high level and large increase in homicide rates. In summary, this suggests that 
countries can neglect or emphasise some aspects of HD without affecting progress on other 
aspects. But increasing levels of violent conflict are particularly harmful to progress. 
 
 
Finally, we presented a few vignettes enriching the story of some of the successful and 
unsuccessful countries to indicate the value of a historical and political economy context to 
accompany the quantitative assessments mainly focused on in the paper. These indicate that 
there are alternative political and institutional patterns  which play a role – for example, a 
strong civil society played an important role in Bangladesh, while prioritizing HD promoting 
expenditures within the social sectors was a feature of Chile’s and Indonesia’s success. 
However, there seem to be more shared characteristics  in the nature of economic 
development– in particular, sustained economic growth at a reasonable rate, supported by a 
diversification of the economy as shown in Chile, Indonesia, Laos and Bangladesh. 
   75 
Failure too has several parents; economic stagnation is one, though the causes of this vary, 
including terms of trade shocks, and poor adjustment policies as well as general economic 
mismanagement (Zambia), and the transition from a socialist economy (in the case of 
Kazakhstan).  HIV-AIDS has also dealt a devastating blow to many societies. 
 
Analyzing success and failure in HD over a 35 year period is evidently a difficult task.  Much 
depends on the metrics chosen and the move from correlation to proving causation has not 
been attempted. But by exploring differences between the successful and weak performers on 
a number of characteristics, paying attention to differing initial conditions, we have  come up 
with some suggestive patterns of success and failure, of relevance to policy makers. At the 
end, however, as the country vignettes indicate, we recognize that there are always important 
country-specific political and historical dimensions which defy quantification and yet help 
determine outcomes.    76 
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